Black Diamond Group Ltd(TSE:BDI)

Web Site
Google Finance
Filing


Nov. 20, 2015
2015 Q3 Data

1.Basic Information
(1) History
Trevor Haynes is the founder. Previously he worked for ATCO Structures & Logistics from 1992 to 2002. At 2003 he found BDI and took it IPO at 2006 as income fund. Later converted to corporation. The company grows quite well to close to $400m sales at 2014.

(2) Business related:
Its main business is the camp and catering which provide housing rental and catering for oil, gas, pipeline companies.  Currently it has around 6000 units with more than 13,000 rooms. It takes around 25% of the total camp market share of Canada.

50% revenue seems related to oil and rest seems less affected by oil price.

The rental business has a very high gross margin which is over 90%. However, it doesn't count the depreciation which is the major expense. The lodging business might have just 30% to 35% margin.

The company uses a declining balance depreciation method instead of straight line which is quite unusual. Boxx fleet uses 6% declining rate, Camps fleets uses 10% declining rate. Those fleets usually can last for 25 years. As mentioned in Q3 2015 release, 2016 maintenance CapX is only $3.0m, however, it is just the repair cost, not the replacement cost. Currently total asset is around $550m.  I am using current $50m depreciation as ongoing maintenance CapX,  future depreciation expense will be lower if there is not much growth CapX.

(3) Management.
CEO: Trevor Haynes.

(4) Debt and Credit facility.
Around $185m debt outstanding right now.
$168m line of credit: $96m outstanding, current interest 3%. Debt covenant: Debt/EBITDA <= 3.0. Currently the ratio < 2.
$50m term loan mature at 2019: interest 5.5%. Annual repayment $12.4m
$40m term loan mature at 2022: interest 4.6%. Annual repayment $13.3m starting July 2020.

(5) Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
Trevor Haynes: 2.5m shares. 6%.
Steven Stein: 1m shares.  2.5%.
Total insider around 15%.

(6) Employee numbers
Around 450 at end of 2014. Current might below 400.

(7) Auditor

(8) Industry comparison.
1) ATCO: the original company Harynes worked for. Its revenue around $4B but camp related revenue just around $800m right now. It seems has 3300 housing units which is close to BDI, and 13000 space rental units.  Because it is diversified, its less affected by the oil price.

2) Horizon North Logistics: Camp revenue $250m in 2015 compare to $280m in 2014. Has around 9500 beds.  It has very little debt.

3) Civeo Corporation: 2015 revenue $500m compare to over $900m in 2014. It might have around 18000 rooms in total. This company seems the most trouble one. At end of 2015, its net debt is around $350m

4) Noralta Lodge: Seems a private company. It has around 6000 of camp rooms which might be half of BDI's size. At end of 2014 it has 560 employees. The company seems doing quite well, it recently even join-opened new service business.

5) Clean Harbors, Inc: Public company. Mainly not on camps.  Camp revenue around $90m in 2015, down half from 2014.

The top four players seems each took around a quarter market share in Canada. Among the four BDI seems the only one that does not do manufacturing.  As stated by the company that the manufacturing business doing good in booming years but well have trouble in bad years, so BDI chose to outsource it. This seems a wise decision. Horizon North and Civeo seems only had business related to oil and gas. These two was hit hard the most. However, Civeo seems the worst managed and has a lot of debt.


(9) Major events
1) Staring Q3 2015, cut dividend from 8c/month to 5c/month. It still needs to pay out dividend around $24m/year. 

2. Financial data.

3. Valuation

Current price around $7 with market cap of $290. Tangible book value around $8.

LNG(Liquified Nature Gas): There are two major LNG pipeline projects in waiting for approve by the federal government at early 2016. Any approve of them will benefit all the four companies. However, the process could be long the result is unknown. Company shouldn't rely on these project to survive.

Assume revenue down to $200m, Gross margin 50%, SG&A 15%, then EBITDA will be 35% which is $70m. Assume $50m depreciation,  $8m interest expense, that would leave just $12m pretax income.  Not good but still profitable. On a cash basis, the maintenance CapX should much lower than $50m,  As indicated in Q3 release, 2016 CapX will be $25m. So it even revenue drops to $150m, it can generate around $52m EBITDA, it still can be cash positive. However, it might need to cut dividend to achieve that in this case. Currently its cash needs is $24m dividend + $8m interest + $12.4m debt repayment + $25m CapX = $70m.

Its BOXX modular business seems not tightly related to oil and gas. It generates $7m/ quarter EBITDA currently. It was acquired from Nortex Modular at 2009 for around $25m. At that time, it has revenue of $35m/year and EBITDA of $6.2m/year.

Among the 3 companies that only doing the camping, this company is in the best shape. The main reason is that it doesn't have manufacturing segment. It is the only one that is still profitable.


4. Risk
1) Don't know how bad the oil sand business will be. It is hard to tell from its report which parts are not affected by the low oil price. In my view, its segment allocation is really poor thus it will reorganize the segment in next year. Hopefully it will provide more clear picture. Currently it is hard to tell what is the bottom line of its revenue.

2) It is hard to tell real maintenance cost of its capital. The depreciation method is not usual. Overall I feel 10% annual depreciation rate is enough.  Real replacement cost might be lower.

5. Conclusion
The company is well managed and been very successful in the past 10 years. With price below tangible book value and it unlikely be cash negative, current price is quite cheap. However, there is risk of continue revenue shrink.

6.Links

Jan. 14, 2016
Recent price dropped to $5 with market cap around $210m.

1) There is not much change except the crude oil dropped to low $30s. Its very likely that the oil sand business part will be really shrinking in the short term. But I believe it still can maintain $150m revenue level in 2016.

2) However, there is two concerns here. First is the debt covenant, currently it needs to maintain around $60m annual EBITDA otherwise it will trigger the default. I believe its asset has not much value if sale them now. If revenue indeed decrease to $150m, the EBITDA really depends the revenue mix, if most revenue is from lodging, then EBITDA possible be below $60m.

3) The second concern is the another dividend cut. If revenue drops to $150m, then it is almost certain will be cut. Even without that, it is still wise to cut dividend to reduce debt. However, the market will react badly any time the dividend is cut.

4) On the plus side, the company is easy to be cash positive. I wish its debt had been lower and don't have the dividend burden.

Ap. 05, 2016
Recent price: $3.90, market cap $150m.

1) Dividend cut to half which is $0.30/year. 2016 CapX reduced to $10m. Currently its new cash needs for 2016 is $12m dividend + $10m CapX + $8m interest +$12.5m debt payment = $42.5m.

2)Reduce net debt to around $154m. Including $70m line of credit and $90m in term loan.

3)There are four segments in the business:
(1)Camps: around $400m in assets, around 3400 units and 12500 beds. valued $120k/units and $30k/beds. Its revenue includes rental income and non-rental revenue. Currently reports revenue combined with BOXX segments. In 2015, total EBIDTA is around $55m.
(2)BOXX: around $100m in assets. around 3700 units, valued around $27k/units. Count rental as revenue. In 2015, total EBIDTA is around $27m. Combined Camps and BOXX, total revenue is around $170m in 2015.  I estimate only $50m to $60m is from BOXX. Around 30% of BOXX is related to oil and gas.
(3)Logistic: Not much asset value, mainly service revenue. Around 30% gross margin. EBIDTA for 2015 is $19m with $87m in revenue.
(4)Energy service and other: 10% of revenue. EBIDTA not much.

4)New valuation:
(1) The BOXX segment seems the most stable one which I believe can still generate $20m-$25m in EBIDTA in 2016 or even better.

(2) Camp and logistic will be report together in 2016. Assume 45% decrease, it will generate $40m in EBIDTA, estimate $15m corp expense in 2016, total EBIDTA will be $45m to $50m. It still can be cash positive. However, the 3:1 debt covenant is kind of close. I would expect it would cut the dividend totally which will leave only $30m basic cash need.

(3) On a valuation basis, the BOXX segment should provide a basic $70m-$80m bottom value for the company. With current $150m market cap. It is value the rest of the company for $70-$80m with net asset value of $250m($400m-$150m). Unless the line of credit became an issue, the company is really cheap now.

(4)Generally I like the management team. It took necessary steps to cut cost and even cut 10% in salary starting 2016. The BOXX segment really provide some bottom line for this company. Otherwise it is hard to tell what will happens and feels it is even worse than Horizon North. But with BOXX, it might do better.

Apr. 20, 2016
Price: $4.20.
(1) The company released 2015 data in reorganized segments. The BOXX segment revenue actually is $62m, but EBITDA is only $19.7m. This is quite different than the reported space rental segment EBITDA of $26.6m. Probably because there is 28% of space rental EBITDA is related to oil & gas which is moved to energy service. Assets belongs to BOXX is $120m.

(2) Energy service EBITDA is $10.8m while previously reported as $4.1m. So the $6.7m is taking from space rental segment in previous report.  Assets: $110m

(3) Camp & lodging EBITDA is $74m which is consistent with previous reported data of $55.3m+$18.9m.  Assets : $250m.

(4) Corporate EBITDA is $18.8m which is $2m more than previous reported data.  Assets: $38m.

(5) BOXX segment is the most stable part which still can generate $20m in EBITDA I believe. Energy service EBITDA is also more stable. I estimate $2m/quarter which equals $8m/year.

(6) Camp&Lodging segment: The rental part has high margin around 90% while non rental has low margin around 30%. Rental revenue down from $12.7m in Q1 to $6.6m in Q4. Rental beds down from 5000 in Q1 to 3000 in Q4. Rate holds pretty well at $25/day.   Lodging Revenue down from $40m to $20m from Q1 to Q4. Beds down from 4300 to 3100. Rate down from $106 to $74.

(7) Assume Lodging beds average 2500 in 2016, day rate $70,  then it would generate 2500*$70*365*30% =$19m EBIDTA. Assume rental beds average 2000 in 2016, then it would generate 2000*$25*365*90% = $16m in EBIDTA.  Totally $35m in EBIDTA.

(8) Assume ($15m) in corporate expense, adding together $20+$8+$35-$15=$48m EBIDTA/year. That is $12m/quarter. Let see how it goes.


May 03, 2016
Price: $4.3
2016 Q1 Data
(1) Net debt $150m. EBIDTA $17.2m.

(2)BOXX segment both revenue and EBITDA are down. The EBITDA is only $3.5m which may drive whole year 2016 EBIDTA only around $15m.

(3)Energy service EBIDTA is also down to just $1.2m. Whole year might be just $5m.

(4)Lodging and Camp are doing better thank I think with EBIDTA of $16.5m. Lodging beds are 3200. Lodging rate is $78 compare to $74 in 2015Q4. Rental beds is 2850.  Rate is $22 compare to $25 in 2015Q4. other revenue is 3.4m. Totally EBIDTA margin is 52% which is much high than 40% level last year. That is how the $16.5m EBIDTA is generated. I guess the lodging EBIDTA margin has at least increased to 40%. Don't know whether they can hold this rate.

(5) Together if Lodging & Camp can generate $10m/quarter EBIDTA for the next 3 quarter, then it is can generate $46m EBIDTA for the whole year. Adding $15m in BOXX and $5m in Energy, deduct $15m in corporate EBIDTA, then it can still generate around $50m in EBIDTA.  With Q1 2016 net EBIDTA $17.2m, the next 3 quarter each need to generate $11m net EBIDTA.

Mar 15, 2017
2016 Year End Data
Price: $3.6. Market Cap $155m. 
(1) 2016 Revenue just a little above $150m.  EBIDTA $42m. Net debt reduced to around $105m. CapX $15m, interest expense $6.1m.  Dividend $15m.

(2) The company acquired Britco from WesternOne at Mar. 2017 for $41m in cash. It issued 7.7m shares at $3.75/share and sell & lease back some assets for $11m. Britco is an addition to BOXX modular. It expected to generate $5m-$10m in EBITDA at 2017.

(3) The company projected 2017 EBITDA to be $35m-$45m including Britco.  CapX $12m.  Total share outstanding around 53m after Britco acquisition. Dividend $16m. Interest $6m. It is just be able to cover those cost and not much will be left to reduce debt.

(4) The $25m share offering at 2016 at $5.05 and $30m share offering at 2017 at $3.03 diluted the company shares quite a bit. However, they were not very bad moves. The debt now is reduced to close to $100m which is more safer. The new acquisition give the company more growth on BOXX side. The company still paying dividend which supported the share price but is quite a burden. There a dividend reinvest program but not sure how many share holders will participate.

(5) The company did worse than I expected at 1.5 years ago. It is impossible to estimate how its each sector will be. However, it is no really important as for now its main task to stay cash positive.

(6) Overall the management did quite well through the years as manage the business quite actively. It could be much worse. The energy industry recovery is very slow and 2017 probably will be worst year for the company. Once it can go through the year, it might do very well after.


Badger Daylighting Ltd(TSE:BAD)

Web Site
Google Finance
Filing


Nov. 9, 2015
2015 Q2 Data

1.Basic Information
(1) History


(2) Business related:

1) Around 50/50 revenue between Canada and US.  50% related to oil and gas and 50% is utility etc.
2) It builds its trucks by itself.

(3) Management.
CEO: Tor Wilson, he joined the company since 2000. He turned around the business and took it public.

(4) Debt and Credit facility.


(5) Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.


(6) Employee numbers

(7) Auditor

(8) Industry comparison.

(9) Major events


2. Financial data.

3. Valuation


4. Risk
According to the BNN video, the CEO stated that less than 25% revenue is directly affected by low oil price and 25% is refinery and major plants related which is pretty stable.

5. Conclusion


5.Links

http://www.bnn.ca/Video/player.aspx?vid=613812#.VVTfZY01gII.email


Oct. 18, 2016
Suppose to publish the study last year but didn't finish it and the price gone up from $20 to $29 now.


Avigilon Corp(TSE:AVO)

Web Site
Google Finance
Filing


Oct, 8, 2015
2015 Q2 Data

1.Basic Information
(1) History
Alexander Fernandes found Quantitative Image, a scientific digital camera company at 1999. The initial funding is $2m It was sold to Roper Industries at 2002 for $20m( or maybe $12m?). At 2004 he started Avigilon to enter the video surveillance market. The initial funding is $7m. It went IPO at 2011 and raised $25m.

(2) Business-related:
The video camera it sells are all digital, range from 1M pixels to 30M pixels. The backend software system from it seems pretty good.

It sales IP system to the integrators and don't sell to retail user. This makes its product more liked by those installers and this is one of the reasons its revenue grows. Currently, it has 2000 integrators.

Around 20% of its revenue is from $500k+ business project. It seems to do quite well on those big projects.

It manufactures in Canada and recently opened the second factory in the US. CEO explained the labor cost only accounts 3.5% of the product.

Usually, Q1 is the weakest, Q2 and Q2 are better quarters than Q1, Q4 is the best quarter in sales.

(3) Management.
Alexander Fernandes: He is the key person in the company and around 50. The company is been profitable since the second year(2008) of product sales.
Wan Jung: He worked with Fernandes at QImage and co-founded AVO. Retired at 2012 after the IPO. 2014 stepped in as intern CFO for one year and then retired again at 2015.


(4) Debt and Credit Facility.
It has no debt until Q2 2015 it took around $100 debt to support share buyback. Cash is around $90m as well.


(5) Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buyback.
Fernandes: 4.9m around 10%
Wan Jung: 3m


(6) Employee numbers
Around 886 at Q2 2015.

(7) Auditor

(8) Industry comparison.
Axis: $500m sales and $80m operating income in 2014,  At Feb. 2015  Canon offer to buy it for $2.8B. Not done yet. The company's major market, gross margin, operating margin, net profit margin all are very close to AVO's. However, its revenue growth rate is less than AVO. In 2Q 2015, its revenue actually is flat.

Pelco: US company, belongs to Schneider Electric. $400m revenue at 2014. Long history but seems not doing very well now.

Bosch: $1.5B euro sales at 2013. However,  it includes stuff like fire detection etc.

Samsung: Part of non-core business sold to Hanwha at end of 2014. Don't know the size.

Sony, Panasonic:

hikvision: 海康威视: 3B$ sales level in 2014. In Hangzhou, its gross margin is less than 50%. However, net profit margin is above 25% which is way above AVO's 10% range. Around 2/3 of its sales is in China. Hikvision is growing very well in recent years as well. I believe it mainly competes with AVO on the lower end product.

VIVOTEK:晶睿通讯: Taiwan company.

uniview: 宇视科技: In Hangzhou

(9) Major events
1) Since 2013, the company acquired several companies which are most holding IP on video analysis. 

2) At 2014, CFO and 4 other executives resigned. The companies stock fall from $30 to a low of $12.

3) 2013, issued 2.8m shares at $24 for $69m. 2014, issued 3.4m at $29 for $100m.

4) Feb. 2015, it purchased a new building in Vancouver for $42m and will use it as new headquarters.

5) It bought-back around 2.1m shares in Q2 2015 at around $18.4/share. Still, 1.6m left to buy.


2. Financial data.


3. Valuation
Currently, it is around 16 P/E for TTM.  On EBITDA basis, it is around 10-11 times. Not really cheap.

When compared to Axis, AVO is around half of Axis's revenue and operating income. Based on Cannon's paid price for Axis, it should worth around $1.4B which is around $30/share.

Recent Q2 2015 running rate is $360m. It is targeting $500m sales running rate at end of 2016. Assume at 2017 it can achieve $500m revenue. Using 13%, 15%, 17% EBITDA margin, it will generate $65m, $75m, $85m EBITDA, using $10m as maintenance CapX, using 30% tax rate. It will generate $38.5m, $45.5m, $52.5m in real income. Using 15 P/E as the fair price, it worth $580m, $680m, $790m by then.


4. Risk
(1) The executives resigned at 2014 which is actually the main reason for the stock to fall. Especially the CFO quit one day before the quarterly data release. The CEO explained that as the company grows, the management must move up or move out. Which suggested that he forced them out because they don't meet his expectations. As Fernandes is a strong leader and the key person in the company and he is still here,  I think this is not that bad as the market reacted. This might be a right move he makes. However, this does indicate he is a pretty tough boss to work with. He seems pretty obsessed with revenue grows. Now he is overseeing 7 departments directly. I am not sure whether he has that energy to do that. There are definitely some concerns here. But I am not overly worried about it.

(2) The company latest R&D and operating expense increased a lot which is also the drive for the stock fall. The SG&A increase mainly from hiring more people. R&D increase is mainly on video analytics. In the first half of 2015, when added back capitalized R&D, its real EBITDA margin is much lower than previous years. I believe in the short term there is some fluctuation, in a longer term, it should be able to back to 15% or 17% EBITDA margin rate. However, it is a real concern that the company might not be as profitable as before.

(3) Competition from cheap Chinese competitor like Hikvision. Usually, Hikvision's hardware price is around 50%-60% of AVO's. However, Hikvison's major market is in China, also its sales model is quite different. Also, its software seems way more valuable than hardware. I think is still quite competitive although its margin might have some pressure.

(4)The company is now heavily invested in Video Analysis and believe it is the future of Video Surveillance. I actually agree with Fernandes's vision. However, it is possible that this won't work.

5. Conclusion
Overall I think is an excellent growth company with a strong management. The CEO has a pretty good tracking record and a good vision.  Current price at around 16 P/E is pretty acceptable for such a high growth company even with some concerns remaining.


5.Links
So far there is not much writing from value blogs which is quite surprising to me.

There is a critic from IPVM about its marketing practice at Jan. 2014:
http://ipvm.com/report/avigilon_ad_critique

About executive departure at Sept. 2015:
http://www.bnn.ca/Video/player.aspx?vid=695194
https://www.biv.com/article/2015/9/move-or-move-out-avigilon-founder-alexander-fernan/

About video analytic acquisition explanation:
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/12040561/inside-avigilons-video-analytics-patent-acquisition-strategy

Update Nov. 05, 2015
Q3 2015
1) After the Q3 data release, the stock plunged over 10%. In my view, the data is actually pretty good. Both R&D% and SG&A% is lower than previous 2 quarters. Also, real EBITDA margin is back to 16%.


Sept. 22, 2017
Price: $17.4, Shares 43.8m. Market cap $760m
(1) The company reports in USD$ since 2016. For 2017, it is expected to generate over $400m in revenue. For the first 2Q, its adjusted EBITDA is around $27m. It is expected to generate over $70m in adjusted EBITDA since last 2 quarter is their best quarters. EBITDA margin should be over 15%.

(2) The company sold its office for $107m in  CAD$ and leased it back. It is supposed to reduce debt to a pretty low level.

(3)After two years since I first wrote about it. It does achieve price close to my high-end estimation ( $760m vs $780m ). The EBITDA should also be close to my estimate ($70m in USD vs $85m in CAD).

(4)Currently, there are $3m/quarter R&D expenses have been capitalized. Those are not included in the adjusted EBITDA calculation.

(5)Last year CapX is $20m, 2017 first 2Q CapX is $20m already. Those mainly due to office renovation. Depreciation expense, however, is only $4m for the first 2Q of 2017. Don't know my $10m maintenance CapX is enough or not. Kind of concerned about whether something is buried inside the numbers.

(6) If subtracting the Maintenance CapX, even at $2/quarter, the real income is much lower. However, currently the company is still focused to improve its profitability, it seems it did quite well for the last several quarters.

(7) The original concern about management departure is no more a big issue. However, on Glassdoor website, there are quite some bad reviews of the company and the CEO.

(8) Assuming by 2020, it can reach $800m USD revenue, using 17% EBITDA margin, using $20m CapX and R&D, 30% tax, it can generate around USD$135m in EBITDA and USD$80m income. Using 20 P/E, it supports around CAD$2B market cap at that time if things go well.


Nov. 08, 2017
Q3 2017 Data, Price: ?? , Shares: $44m, Cap:
(1) The company released earlier that CEO Fernandes will be replaced by COO  James Henderson at 2018.

(2) Fernandes sold 600k shares at $19. Reduced from 4.9m shares to 4.3m shares. Now less than 10%.

(3) Q3 did very well with $108m revenue(15% growth). Net income $9m, around 8.3% of revenue. For the full year of 2017, revenue expected to be over $400m which is 15% growth rate.

(4) My Sept estimate seems wrong. If using 15% growth rate, by 2020, it might generate $600m revenue which is around $750m in CAD$. Using 10% net income, 20% P/E, it should support $1.5B Cap.

Knight Therapeutics Inc(TSE:GUD)

Web Site
Google Finance
Filing


Oct, 1, 2015
2015 Q2 Data

1.Basic Information
(1) History
This is a pretty new company found by Jonathan Ross Goodman at 2014. He found Paladdin 19 years before 2014 and sold it for over 3B which returned over 100 times over the 17 years on public trading years.

(2) Business related:
Paladdin acquire medicines and marketing them. Basically GUD is doing the same thing right now.


(3) Management.
Jonathan Ross Goodman

(4) Debt and Credit facility.
No debt.

(5) Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
Jonathan holds around

(6) Employee numbers

(7) Auditor

(8) Industry comparison.

(9) Major events

2. Financial data.



3. Valuation
Currently the stock is around $7 with market cap around $730m. While book value is around $5.10. Mostly in cash and some investment in several funds etc.

Goodman is the major asset of the company. For the 17 years of previous company, he had made 100 times return for the original share holder. Even  using the price before the acquisition, it was still over 50 time the original investment. Which translated as 25% annual return compounded.


4. Risk
The major risk is actually whether Goodman can repeat his success in previous company. Although it is likely but need more study of previous company. Also the current company invested quite a lot in some funds which I don't know whether is common in previous company.

5. Conclusion
Goodman is a very successful in its previous business. Basically it is an investment on him. It is still pretty early stage and I am not really understand the business.


5.Links


Tandy Leather Factory, Inc.(NASDAQ:TLF)

Web Site
IR Home
Google Finance
Filing


Sept, 14, 2015
2015 Q2 Data

1.Basic Information
(1) History
The company was created by Wary Thompson(around 30%) and Ronald Morgan and Robin Morgon(around 30%) at 1980. In 1993, it reverse merged with National Transfer & Register Corp. From 1996 to 1998, the company had some loses and then recovered. From 2000 to 2005, the company expend and did pretty well. Before 2000, its sales around $25-$30m. 2005 grows to $50m. Revenue stays flat till 2009 at $55m. Then the company had steady grow from 2010 to 2014.  At end of 2014 revenue is above $80m.

Since 2003, the original holder start to dispose their position. At 2006, Wary decreased his holding to only 2%. while Morgan family still hold 16%. At 2009, the Morgon family decrease their position and 2010, they seems totally disposed their position. Now Jon Thompson(seems Wary's son) is the CEO and hold 2% of the company.

(2) Business related:
The company sale leathers and tools for leather craft making individuals. Leathers account around 40% of sales. Hand tools 15%, rest 45%. It has around 30 wholesales stores, 80 retail stores. 85% sales in domestic, 15% international.  2/3 sales in from retail while wholesale counts 1/3. Wholesale gross margin is higher than retail margin.

A typical retail store is around 3000 sqf to 6000 sqf and has 3 to 4 employees. A managers base salary is around $25k/year at 2007,   increased to $36k/year at 2014, plus 1/4 of the operation profit of the store made. Other employees are minimum wage workers.

It has a light factory and produce 15% of its product. Rest 85% is outsourced.

The company carries quite a lot inventory which is close 2 quarter sales. The reason is that its inventory is not fashion product and won't obsolete. Also, the company likes to buy leather at large quantity when price is cheap.

(3) Management.
Shannon Greene

(4) Debt and Credit facility.
The company has $2m debt and around $11m in cash.

(5) Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
Jon Thompson 2% of shares.
Bandera Partners LLC : A hedge fund, 27.6%

(6) Employee numbers.
Around 600 employees at end of 2014

(7) Auditor


(8) Industry comparison.


(9) Major events.


2. Financial data.



3. Valuation
Recent price is $7. Shares 10.3m. Market Cap around $77m. Tangible book value around $5/share. Cash $11m. Debt around $2m.

The company is quite profitable except some lose at 1996 and 1998.  A typical store generates around $750k in annual revenue, cost of product is about $300k. Profit share cost $110k. Base salary for 3 employees might be $100k. Rest might has around $150k in corporate expense.

One interesting fact about the company is that during 2006 to 2010, the company opened 25 new stores. Operating expense grow from 46% to 51% while total revenue almost flat. Don't know why the sales in not picking up.

Since 2011 to 2014, the company only opened 8 new stores, but revenue grow a lot faster. The reason behind it is the moving store from 2000 sqf to 5000 sqf strategy seems worked. Operating income/store grow from $40k to over $100k. However, it is unknown whether they can keep the profitability.

The company's CapX in late 3 years is much higher than depreciation which reduced FCF by $1m compare to net income. It moved 30 stores to bigger location by end of 2014( 12 at 2012 and ?? at 2013). Each store move cost around $100k. At Q1 2015 conference, it plans to continue move 6 stores/year for the next 5 years. Also it launched a big flagship store(15k sqf showroom) at 2013.  Based on conference call, the maintenance CapX should be around $1m to $1.2m.  CapX for new store is around 150k each. 2016 CapX should around $1.5m to $1.7m. Roughly current depreciation should be able to match CapX.

The business is quite stable and well managed. However, in recent years its gross margin and net profit margin is much higher than average. In 2015, those are under pressure.

Assuming 80m sales, using 61% gross margin, 49% operation expense, it can get 12% gross profit. Assuming 35% tax rate. The net profit is $80m*12%*(1-35%)=$6.2m. Around 60c/share.

If assuming 80k/store pretax income. It would generate around $9m pretax income. After tax is also $6m.

4. Risk
(1) The main concern is the operating expense grows faster than revenue. On a store bases it has increased quite a lot since 2010 while expense/employee grows in a slower rate. the main reason it that it has moved to larger store and needs extra stuff pay higher rent.  Still this is something to watch closely.

(2) The management is from the original family but holds very few shares. Don't know why the family dumped the shares.

(3)It is a retail business, although it is less cynical like finished goods retailer. Its profit still could be swinging.

5. Conclusion
It is a well managed company the manager seems pretty honest and straight forward. It sever a niche market and pretty stable. However, retail business could fluctuate quite some.

6.Links


http://gannonandhoangoninvesting.com/blog/2013/9/25/quans-avid-hog-watchlist-tandy-leather-factory-tlf


Apr. 12, 2016
Recent price $6.75. 
(1) Full year 2015 net cash is $6m. Used $3.70m buy back 500k shares.  Now shares outstanding 9.5m. Market Cap is: $62m.  Net cash $7m.  EV is only $55m.  While whole year EBIT is $10.5m which make a EV/EBIT is just about 5.

(2)


AutoCanada Inc.(TSE:ACQ)

Web Site
http://www.autocan.ca/investors.htm
Google Finance
Filing


Aug, 17, 2015
2015 Q2 Data

1.Basic Information
(1) History
Patrick(Pat) Priestner found the company at 1993 and grows to 5 dealership at 2001.  It grew to 14 dealership and IPO at 2006 on TSE as an income fund. Then converted to a corporation at 2009. Now It grow to around 50 dealerships with annual sales around 40k vehicles.

(2) Business related:
Auto dealership's business is quite simple relatively. Their revenue source: new vehicle sales, used vehicle sales, service and parts. A typical dealership might sale 1000 to 2000 vehicles per year. Likely 2/3 in new vehicles and 1/3 in used vehicles. For each vehicle,

Seasonality: New vehicle sales high to low Q3(30%), Q2, Q4, Q1(20%). Used vehicle Q2(27%), Q3, Q1 then Q4(21%) and less seasonal.

Floor plan loan: a common practice for financing vehicle inventory. Usually it is just a little lower than the inventory balance and the rate is quite good. Currently the company has around $620m in inventory and $607m in floor plan loan.

On an average,  a dealership may make $1m to $1.5m in annual net income. To buy a dealership might cost $15m to $25m or 5-6 times of EBIDTA.

ACG (Auto Canada Group?): A private company controlled by Pat and hold around 10% of the ACQ's share. The company is mainly for the requirement of GM for 15% of the interest of dealership must be hold by Pat( need clarify? ).


(3) Management.
Pat is the key person in the company. He started as a college drop off in auto dealer industry and doing incredibly good in selling autos. Then started his own dealership and growing to more dealers. His brother did the same thing but still remain private with over 30 dealership under his name I guess. Currently Pat is the executive chairman of the company. I guess his main focus is on acquiring new dealerships.

(4) Debt and Credit facility.
1) Floorplan loan: around $600m with interest rate < 3%.
2) Term loan: $150m, 5.625% due May 2021
3) Revolver: $200m revolver,  $130m outstanding at end of Q3 2015. Prime+0.75%--2%, current around 4.5%.

(5) Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
Pat hold around 9% of the common shares.
Tom Orysiuk(CEO) hold around 2% of common shares.

(6) Employee numbers
Currently around 3500 employees. By average, around 70 to 80 employee/dealership.

(7) Auditor
PricewaterhouseCoopers

(8) Industry comparison.
In Canada, ACQ is the only public dealership company. In US, there are several companies.
Dilawri Group of Companies: Canada largest private dealership group, 53 dealerships. 2200 employees. Store seems smaller than ACQ with lower employee numbers/store.

(9) Major events
1) At 2014 acquired 17 dealership by issuing around $200 in stock and over $100 increase in debt.

2. Financial data.

(1)At 2008, the company write down intangible of $125m.
(2)At 2011, the company reversed some of the write down in 2008($21m I guess).


3. Risk
(1) The company's revenue is heavily rely on western Canada province which is currently under depression. The situation for sure will be worse. The company's revenue and income for sure will be lower in the near future.  Also the whole Canadian economy might in depression soon plus real estate bubble may pop. That would also has a major negative effect on this company.

(2) Pat has quite a lot interest outside the company and keep reducing his share. However, part of the reason for his reducing share is to fund purchase of new GM dealership in ACG.


4. Valuation

Current price is around $27. Share outstanding 24.5m. Market cap $660m. Current net debt is around $220m. Tangible book value is around 0.

At end of 2014, total paid in capital is $440m. From 2007 to 2014, the company's real earning is around $160m. Returned $100m through dividend. The rest $60m is used to fund the acquisition. Total invested capital + retained earning is around $500m. When add $380 intangible and the $100m write down/reverse in 2008/2011. Real balance of intangibles is $480m. Given current tangible book value is zero, this means all the invested capital is just converted to intangibles.

2014 EBITDA is just about $100m. The company was trading much higher in 2014 as high as $90. Currently its trading around 9-10 times EV/EBIDTA which is pretty a fair price if there is no grows. On a P/E basis, it is trading around 16 P/E which is pretty fair.

However, If you using acquisition cost/vehicle cost as a matrix, previous to 2013, the cost to acquire per one vehicle annual sale is below $5000. 2013 to 2014 the cost is over $7000 per vehicle. Which indicate $466 net income/vehicle using 15 P/E.  Using 52000+12000=64000 as normal annual sales, using $7000 per vehicle, the price for the total company is just $450m. Which indicate only a $18.50 share price.

From profit/vehicle side, by average is $580/vehicle while lately is over $1000. If using $800/vehicle using 15P/E, then the fair value per vehicle sale could be $12000. Then fair value would be $770m for the company. The good price would be $460m. That would be $19/share.

The company is a grows investment with pretty strong management.  The price is probably is still a little high. Given currently bad economy, in near term,  more down side pressure.


5.Links


https://oraclefromomaha.wordpress.com/2015/02/09/autocanada-its-time-to-back-up-the-truck-literally/

Nov. 30. 2015
Lately it enter a private placement with CIBC at $25.50/share for $75m. CIBC has an option to buy another $11m at the same price. Share price dropped from over $30 to around $25.5. The company want to use the proceeds to reduce the revolver debt.

Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc.(NYSE:HOS)

Web Site
http://ir.hornbeckoffshore.com
Google Finance
Filing


July, 20, 2015
2015 Q1 Data

1.Basic Information
(1) History
Offshore supply vessels company. Provide transportation and services for off shore oil rigs.  It was founded by Todd Hornbeck(current CEO)at 1997. Previously in 1980, his dad, Larry Hornbeck founded the original Hornbeck Offshore Services Inc. It went IPO next year and grew to a 100+ vessel company. Todd was working for the original company for several years until it was merged with Tidewater in 1996.  In 1997, Todd left tidewater and create the new company from scratch. It went IPO at 2004 and grow to have around 60 vessels now mainly build from new and some acquisitions.

(2) Business related:
Day rate: The rate it charge its customers per vessel per day. Its a very important rate number. However, it is also pretty misleading. For example, different specific vessels have different day rates. So compare historic day rate might be hard because the vessel mix will change a lot as time goes by. Also compare rates between different OSV provider might not show the true picture. Also currently the day rate is under price pressure. But it is hard to tell from the day rate released. So far I still couldn't understand it very well.

Utilization rate: The vessels are really in service compare to total vessels. Usually the company can enjoy over 80% Utilization rate which much higher than its competitors.

Stacking: In a downturn when no demand for service, the company will park some older vessels on shore and laid off all workers. This will significantly reduce the cost. Currently the company stacked 18 vessels.

Drydocking: It is requirement for OSV to be maintained twice in each 5 years period. The cost is capitalized an amortized in 30 months(2.5 years) once the work is done. When a vessel is stacked, the drydocking can be postponed. But it must be done before it can be put back to service again.


(3) Management.
Todd Hornbeck: 47 years old, CEO and founder. He had worked for his dad's old company at a very young age. He found the new company at around 29 years old. The company was create with no vessels and just $1M capital. He managed the company pretty well. From many part, it is much than its competitors. Its vessels is much newer and enjoy a better margin around 50%-60%. SG&A expense, is very consistent at 10% and controlled very well.


(4) Debt and Credit facility.
The company currently has 3 debts totally around $1B. All mature at around 2020. Average interest rate is around 5% which indicate a $50m annual interest expense currently.

(5) Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
Todd Hornbeck: 830k around 2.3%.

(6) Employee numbers.
Around 1640 at 2014 year end.

(7) Auditor
Ernst & Young LLP

(8) Industry comparison.
1) Tidewater: The biggest one which the original Hornbeck merged to at 1996. The company has around 300 vessels. Revenue around 1.5B/year. Current market cap below $1B while book value around $2.5B. It has gross margin around 40% and SG&A ratio around 15%. It seems its vessels is more older than HOS with gross asset value of $4.8B compare to HOS's $2.3B. It seems only a meaningful competitor to HOS in Mexico while not much in GoM.

2) Seacor Holdings: Has over 170 vessels, however, it seems includes a lots of mini vessels. Gross asset value $2.4B compare HOS's $2.3B. Its business is more diversified. The offshore business is not doing good but others seems OK. Annual revenue around $1.3B. Gross margin in 30%'s. SG&A over 10%. Market cap around $1.1B with Book value $1.4m. Also its vessels seems have much lower book value than HOS. it sold 14 vessels in 2014 for less than $180m compare HOS sold 3 vessels for $114m. It seems only a meaningful competitor in Mexico to HOS while not much in GoM.

3) Edison Chouest Offshore: Private company. Over 200 vessels. It also is a ship builder. Major competitor ot HOS in GoM(#1).

4) Harvey Gulf: Family business. Has around 50 OSVs and 3 MPSVs. Major competitor in both US GoM(#3) and Mexico(#2). Roughly has the same market shares as HOS on both area.

(9) Major events.
1) 2013: The company sold all downstream business(Tugs, Tanks) for $227.5m

2) 2015 Q1: The company sold 3 vessels to US military for $114m with 4th pending later this year. Each vessel logged a pretax gain for around $11m. 

2. Financial data.

(1)The amortization charge is soled the deferred drydocking expense. Need more study on this.


3. Valuation
Recent price is $16.5. Shares 35.7m. Market Cap around $600m. Tangible book value around $39/share. Cash $185m. Debt around $1070m. Net debt is about $900m.

The company's result is quite consistent. Before 2010, its gross margin is in the 60%, after that it is in the 50%. SG&A is around 10%. EBITDA is in the 50% and 40% for before and after 2010. Interest Expense currently is around $50m/year. It might go down once the debt is going down.  Maintenance CapX is hard to figure out. Using the depreciation and amortization number, it should be around $100m/year currently.

In a recovery case, the company could still get around $600m revenue. Using 45% EBITDA margin, $100m Maintenance CapX, $50m interest,  35% tax rate. It could generate (600*45%-100-50)*(1-35%)=$78m in net income.

In a bad case, assume it gets $400m revenue. 35% EBITDA margin. The rest the same. It will likely to report a loss.


4. Risk
(1)The founder own quite a few shares which is not what I like to see. Also the compensation for management is quite generous although most of them are stocks. On the plus side, he seems pretty good in doing the business with great experience and pretty good control on cost.

(2) Currently there is way more over supply of OSV vessels. Plus the low oil price, the whole OSV industry is in trouble. The company could see serious revenue and margin decrease.

(3) The debt it has is a little bit high, I wish it could be just in the $500m level.

(4) It is harder to understand its maintenance CapX. The drydocking expense is capitalized and amortized. It does provide a number on maintenance CapX, but contains quite some items. Need do more study.

5. Conclusion
(1) The current share price is just several dollars than its IPO in 2004, while the book value tripled, the company has accumulate over $600m in equity during the past 11 years.

(2) If the company can survive current storm, the current price is very attractive. Given the good management and the better shape it has than its competitors, I am quite confident that it will likely to survive.  However, it is hard to tell when that will happen and how bad the downturn is, just likes the CEO has said, it is just a matter of a V shape or a U shape. I think it is more likely be a U shape, it might take several years until the company can regain grows again.


6.Links




Consolidated HCI Holdings Corporation(TSE:CXA.B)

Google Finance
Filing

Year End: Sept. 30.

May. 19, 2015
2015 Q2 Data

Current Price: $2.45

1.Major Business.
Real estate investment company. It has been active for a while, since 2007, it scaled down by selling the properties it have and paid distribution to share holder. Now it only owns 50% of 2 rental properties at Keele&HWY 7 area.


2.Balance sheet.
Share outstanding 20.6m. Market Cap: $50m.  Equity: $52m. Cash: $41.5m + $3.5m marketable security. Debt $3.5m. Restate value: $10.5m.


3.Credit facility.
Not important.

5.Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
Insiders own over 70%(15m shares) of all shares.

6.Management compensation.


7.Employee numbers. Revenue/Employee. Compensation/Employee.


8.Industry comparison.


9.Auditor


10.Major events.


11.Comments.
(1) This is a typical cigar butt type of investment. The company will pay $1.5/share dividend at June 18th.  After that, the company will have around $10.5 cash + $10.5 real estate in equity. If using current price $2.45, it would have $19.5m in market cap after dividend payment which isn't like a deal.

(2) The two properties include one 212k sqft industry/commercial building which was originally purchased at 2005 at around $9.2m. Later it has been renovated to use part as commercial property. Total cost increased to $12.8m. The building is 42% (90k) use for commercial and 58% used as industrial. At 2012, the company leased 30k sqft to Goodlife fitness ??? and spend $1.2 in renovation. Currently it use a DCF method to value it with $1.6m/year rental and a 8% discount rate. Current value on book is $19.2m. Currently the rental ratio is 71% which give is around $12.5/sqft rental rate.

(3) Based on TREB(Toronto Real Estate Board) data, currently average rental for industrial building is  around $5/sqft, rental for commercial building is around $20/sqft. The company's rental rate is  $12.5/sqft which is quite reasonable as it is mix of industrial and commercial.

(4) Based on TREB data, current industrial building market price is around $100/sqft. commercial building market price is around $200-$300/sqft. Use 58% industrial+42% commercial to value the building, it would be worth around  $30m. The company's share is $15m. Which is $5m over the book value. Thus make its fair book value around $26m after dividend payment.

(5) The another building is located besides the first building and it is on a 1.25 acres land it purchased for $1.6m at 2010. Currently it has been rented by A&W. The company spend $0.3m for land improvement. Currently the land is booked as $1.8m with 5.75% discount rate of rental income of $120k/year.

(6) The major risk is that the TRSB's data is pretty inaccurate because of very limited number of transaction disclosed. Also the real estate bubble may pop any time. However, the value on book does seems significantly lower than market value.

(7) Although it had paid dividend for several times since 2007, it is uncertain what the management intent to do after this dividend. It might take years for it do sell the last two properties and distribute the cash. The $800k rental revenue/year which is just about to cover the operating cost.

(8) Assuming after 4 years we can get the fair value of $26m. Using 20% discount rate, currently price would be $12.5m which is $0.60/share. Before dividend, it should be $2.10/share.  Current market price is not cheap enough.


12.Links

Feb. 27, 2017
Current Price $1.04
(1) The company will sell the last building by end of 2017.

(2) Currently there are $14.3m in cash and alike which is $0.69/share. The rental assets are booked as $13.5m in assets and $4.9m in liability including $1.5m tax payable. Totally close to $10m net asset booked for the rental assets. Total equity is $24m which is $1.16/share.

(3) Currently the plaza is valued at $12.3x2=$24.6m which is $116/sqft. The current estimate rental for the plaza is $1.8m/year. Using 200k sqft, it comes $9/sqft.

At 2014, the unit 8A which is next to the Goodlife fitness was listed for rent as $14/sqft. This is located in the industrial part. Half of it was later rented at 2015 by limelight and the rest was rented at 2016 as daycare place.
https://spacelist.ca/p/on/vaughan/7700_keele_st/8a

The unit 4 was also listed for rent at 2014 for $17/sqft with base rate of $13/sqft. This unit was rented by Daniel Leather at Nov. 2016.
https://spacelist.ca/p/on/vaughan/7700_keele_st/4



(4) Currently A&W place is valued at $1.2x2=$2.4m which is $960/sqft. The current rental for A&W is $125k/year. using 2500 sqft, it comes $50/sqft.

(5) The A&W is quite fairly valued while the plaze might be undervalued. If in case the plaza can be sold at $150/sqft, then the fair value would be $32m that is $7.5m above current estimation, if using 25% tax rate, it could be around $5.5m net gain which will be $25c/share. So book value would be $1.40/share.



Ever-Glory International Group Inc(NASDAQ:EVK)

Web Site
http://www.ever-glory.com
http://www.ever-glory.com.cn/index.asp
Google Finance
Filing


Feb, 03, 2015
2014 Q3 Data

1.Basic Information
(1) History
Chinese garment manufacturer(江苏华瑞服饰). Founded by Kang, Yihua(康宜华) at 1993,  starting as exporter, Create its own brand LA GO GO since 2008.  Now wholesale and its own brand both count around 50% of revenue. IPO in US through reverse merger at 2008.

It use a off shore BVI company as a middle layer between the US shell company and Chinese company.  It seems pretty typical.

(2) Management.
Kang, Yihua: CEO and founder
There are many writings about this person on internet and links are provided below. He is very detail oriented and at the same time has quite good vision into future. I have some confidence on him.
His compensation is modest at around $100k/year.

(3) Credit facility.
Several small loans(around $5m each) bear interest rate around 6.5%. Total balance is $50m now, however, it includes around $20m in counter guarantee.

(4) Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
Kang, Yihua: 4.8m
Ever-Glory Enterprises (H.K.) Ltd: 5.6m. Now 83% controlled by Kang, Huake and 17% controlled by Yan, Xiao Dong.
Kang, Huake(康华珂): Son of Kang,Yihua. Aug 2014, He acquired 83% of Ever-Glory HK. from Yan, Xiao Dong. Previously at 1998, when Kang, Yihua decided to let go Yan, he transferred Ever-Glory HK to Yan. Now Yan is giving back most to his son. 
Yan, Xiao Dong(阎晓东):400k + 17% of Ever-Glory HK.

(5).Employee numbers.
6500 employees, main are retail worker and manufacturing worker.

(6) Auditor
Since 2009: GHP Horwath P.C

(7) Industry comparison.
Its revel and partner La Chapelle IPO at HK 2014, Current market cap is around $900m with $1B revenue and $65m net income in 2013. 2014 revenue and income should be like $1.3B and $90m. It   seems more profitable than EVK's retail business. La Chapelle is very close to La Go Go which aiming to the same age group.

(8) Major events.

2. Financial data.

(1) The company controlled by CEO called Jiangsu Ever-Glory acted as guarantee for its debt. The company provided cash of 70% of borrows as counter guarantee to Jiangsu Ever-Glory and it pays back interest. This is a pretty odd arrangement which I don't understand the reason.  The company deducted the counter guarantee amount from equity as it might not be able to get it back. As a result, the company's real debt is over-stated while equity is under-stated. I have added the counter guarantee amount back to reflect more real picture of those two numbers.

(2) At end of 2013, it recorded one time $3.2m in tax reserve for its HK Ever-Glory's Samoan subsidiary. As Sept. 2014, the tax is still not paid out yet.

(3)At Q4 2013, it recorded around $8m in inventory reserve which is not consistent with previous quarters and later quarters. Based on the company 10-K, it write down slow moving or obsoleted material and finished goods aged more than one year. However, since its stores are gradually opened so the inventory in the stores should be gradually built up. Thus unsold goods of one years old should be gradually accumulated. Also the raw materials it has is just several million, so it shouldn't contains a large write off. Although there are some $25m inventory of work-in-progress, I think it is unlikely to have provision in it.  I do feel it is possible that the write off at Q4 is intensional so it can report a smaller income.

(4) There is a report on Internet says that in 2014 the company paid over RMB100m(USD$16m) in tax. At Q3 2014, the company has paid $2m in tax and $5.3m tax payable. The $16m might includeVAT tax.


3. Valuation
Recent price is $6.32. Shares 14.78. Market Cap around $93m. Tangible book value around $5.9. Cash $16m. Debt around $50m. Net debt is about $13m.

For the past, the company had very sold grows, ones the CEO stated that it is aiming an $1.5B annual sale by 2018 which indicate a 40% annual revenue increase from now. It is hard but possible based on past performance. Currently I assume no grows.

Its margin are in steady decrease since 2008 financial crisis. However, net income is still growing well. Current market cap is around 10 times of 2013 net income which excludes the $3.2m tax reserve already.  If Q4 2014 net income is $3m, then it would have $16m net income for full year 2014. It is unknown whether the company will record another big inventory allowance at Q4 2014.


From cash flow point, its 2013 FCF-WC is above $15m which higher than net income caused by some tax reserve not being paid and inventory reserve.

EBIDTA wise, assume $30m/year, $10m in CapX, $2m in interest, 25% interest rate. It comes around ($30-$10-$2)*(1-0.25)=$13.5m in actual annual cash generation.

4. Risk
(1) As a Chinese reverse merger, generally they embed high risk of fraud. However, unlike those which I can pretty easy to tell something is not looking real, so far I have found no evidence or hint that the company has engaged in fraud. Still it is possible that the numbers they provided are not real, but I feel it is a pretty low possibility.

(2)Fashion trend change quickly. Both EVK and La Chapelle was doing quite well in the past by target lower margin, quick follow trend, good inventory management. In 2012, China garment industry seems had a big crisis but those two doesn't affected. It is still unknown how robust these two companies. Whether can they survive new bad retail environment. .  

(2)Although it is quite profitable in the past. From cash flow point, all the cash generated were used to found store expansion. It is risky if inventory is building up and it failed monitor it. If in the future its sales slow down, it might suffer huge loses.  It seems many garment companies in china has encountered this. Current inventory/store is around a quarter sales which seems acceptable. However, whether the 20% allowance for obsolete inventory is too much remains a question.

(3)The CEO and his son now control over 2/3 of the shares outstanding. There is only 4m shares floating. The main purpose for him to put the company on public is to gain recognition of its garment brand. It is hard for this type of company to get a fair valuation by market until it starts to pay out dividend which is unlikely. Also the transactions of him give his stock to Yan at 1998 and now his son got it back, the counter guarantee with JiangSu Ever Glory are scary to foreign investors unless you have faith on Kang's integrity which I do have some though.


5. Conclusion
The company is very cheaply priced. Unless it is a fraud, it should worth double the current price.


Kobex Capital Corp(CVE:KXM)

Web Site
Google Finance
Filing


Feb. 11, 2015
2014 Q3 Data

1.Major Business.
Previously its a mining company. Now it has been converted to a investment company which close to close end fund.


2.Balance sheet.
Recent price is $0.49. Share outstanding 45.6m. Market Cap: $22.3m. Equity value $34.5m. $28.9m in cash + $5.6m in stock investment.


3.Credit facility.


5.Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
Paul van Eeden: president, 4.65m around 10%.
There is 2m options outstanding, ave price $.63.

6.Management compensation.


7.Employee numbers. Revenue/Employee. Compensation/Employee.


8.Industry comparison.


9.Auditor


10.Major events.


11.Comments.
(1) This is a very simple stock. Paul van Eeden prepare to use it to invest in junior mining companies. Currently it is trading about 65% of NAV.

(2) Based on Q3 2014, the company's running rate is around $800k which is about 2.35% of total asset. That includes all corporate expenses. Currently the $29m cash generates around $400k in interest every year. That is around 1.4%.  After the interest income, the company's burning rate is just $400k/year.

(3) In June, 2014, it invest $5m in private placement for 1m share of  Mountain Province Diamonds(TSE:MPV). At June 30th and Sept 30th the stock price is $5.11 and $5.6. Currently MPV's price is down to $4.9 again.

(4) Glenn wrote quite well information about MPV in below link. However, currently the construction is 60% completed. And expect to began commercial production in 2017. I will spend more time on it when got time. During the past half year, most mining stock got hit hard because of oil price jump. But MPV has been preformed quite well compare to them.

(5) Paul van Eeden is pretty successful running Cranberry Capital which is a private investment company. His view of fair value of gold is quite impressive. If I have time, I would read more of his writings.

(6) In my opinion, Paul van Eeden did a great job to cut the cost and tuning the company around. If he cautiously select and invest in resource sector, given currently the whole sector is been beating down, the company might doing very well in the future.

12.Links
https://glennchan.wordpress.com/tag/kobex-minerals-cvekxm/

Updated July 08, 2015
Current Price: $0.455.
(1) Now market price $20m. Book value around $33.5m. It now has 1.175746m share of MPV after right offering. Current price of MPV is close to $5.00.

(2)Q1 2015 running rate decreased to just $30k including interest income. Interest income of the $28m cash is only $91k close to 1.3% annual rate.

(3)After one more year, Paul van Eeden is still not making new investment. I think he continue buying for his Cranberry Capital for a larger position or just there is no good investment candidate for him. With mining stock down a lot those days. His investment to MPV seems pretty a good one.

(4)The company currently has $12.6 capital loss and $21m non-capital loss for tax. If use 50% discount for non-capital loss and a 25% tax rate. It comes with ($12.6 + $21*50%)*25% = $5.7m. This is some hidden value which is not included in its financial statement.

(4)Currently it is trading just 60% of book value with lower running rate. However, when I am using a DCF calculation with 3 years and a 20% discount rate. It just about to make a even at $19.1m market cap.  Overall current price is more attractive than before.


Update:

https://glennchan.wordpress.com/2015/10/30/kingsway-financials-activist-battle-with-kobex-capital/



Senvest Capital Inc(TSE:SEC)

Web Site
Google Finance
Filing


Feb. 11, 2015
2014 Q3 Data

1.Major Business.
This is kind of a close end hedge fund which is running as a corporation. Similar to Urbana.


2.Balance sheet.
Recent price is $162. Shares 2.79m. NAV at end of Sept. 30 is $221. Which implied an discount at 70%. However, based on Saj's writing below, Q4 2014 it should have quite a bit increase in NAV.

Senvest Master Fund (Senvest Partners fund) : 43%
Senvest Israel Partners, L.P: 48%

3.Credit facility.

4.Financial data by years.

5.Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.


6.Management compensation.
2013 top 3: $3.5m

7.Employee numbers. Revenue/Employee. Compensation/Employee.


8.Industry comparison.


9.Auditor


10.Major events.


11.Comments.
(1) Based on my calc, assuming Israel Partners is about 1/10 the size of Master Fund, assume the none fund assets stay the same value except currency exchange value. Thus would give a current NAV around $255/share. Current share price $162 is around 64% of NAV.

(2) The company is way more complicated than URB. Also it is much less transparent. It had generated quite decent return during the past. But need more study to figure out how they invest despite the current price is quite a discount to its NAV.

12.Links
http://www.oddballstocks.com/2013/04/anyone-can-invest-in-this-above-average.html

http://www.barelkarsan.com/2015/01/senvest-capital-deep-value-growth.html



Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A.(NASDAQ:ASPS)

Web Site
Google Finance
Filing


Jan. 13, 2015
2014 Q3 Data

1.Major Business.
The company is a spin off of Ocwen Financial Corp(NYSE:OCN) at 2009.  It is major business is Default management and REO(Real estate owned) asset management. When a mortgage is in default, the lender need to use its service to get some value back from the underline assets.  Ocwen is its major customer and account 60% of its revenue currently.


2.Balance sheet.
Recent price is $19. Shares 20.2m+2m options. Market Cap around $400m. Tangible book value < 0. Cash $170m. Debt around $600m.

3.Credit facility.
$590m term loan due 2020. Current interest rate 4.5%.

4.Financial data by years.

5.Insider holding, options, Insider trading info, share buy back.
William C. Erbey: 6.8m including options. around 29.4%


6.Management compensation.
2013 top 3: $3.5m

7.Employee numbers. Revenue/Employee. Compensation/Employee.
As end of 2013, 1800 in US. 5600 in India. It indicate at Jan 2015 that it will cut employee by 800.

8.Industry comparison.


9.Auditor
Deloitte & Touche

10.Major events.
(1)Oct. 2014, it reported to exit the insurance brokerage business which could lower its eps $2.0/share to $2.6/share. Share price dropped a lot.

(2)Dec. 2014, Ocwen settled with New York Dept. of Finance Service(DFS) for $150m, plus Erbey resign from board of all his five companies including Ocwen and ASPS. Share price dropped a lot.

(3)Jan. 2015, California state agency seeking to suspend Ocwen license for one year. Share price dropped a lot.

(4)As a result of all the events above, The share price dropped from high of $170/share to now below $20 as Jan. 13, 2015.

11.Comments.
(1)The main soul of the company is Erbey and he is a incredible business person. Following link explains quite well his work of building Ocwen.
http://www.thestreet.com/story/12083751/1/bill-erbey-made-23b-off-your-underwater-mortgage.html

(2)As many writings about it already on internet. Its major strength is its low cost than competitors by outsourcing to India. Also its very innovative of doing business such as paying people for leaving home or share the lost and profit of home value change. It is able to create a win-win solution for its customer and itself.

(3)Based on gross margin around 35%. Operating margin is around 20%.  Net margin is above 15%. Non-Ocwen business revenue is around $400m. Using this number, it could generate $80m operating profict for non-Ocwen business alone. Taking $600*5% as interest expense, it still got $80-$30=$50m before tax income. Taking 10% tax rate, it could still generate $45m/year net income for non-Ocwen business. Clearly current market cap of $400m is really cheap. People are expecting more bad to come or just scared.

(4)I think the main problem with all Erbey's business is 1) It is growing too fast and service quality wasn't able to catch up. The settlement with NYDFS is actually a good thing for them because it would force them to improve service quality. 2) The government don't like them for tax reason or political reason. It pays a very low tax rate which I don't view as a wise move. Also as non-banking loan servicer it doesn't has much influence on politics.

(5)Overall I like this business and I don't view it as an evil company although its service quality could be better. Compare to Ocwen, ASPS is much a safer business and has a higher moat. Given Erbey's big stack on this company, I think he can continue to influence the company in a good way. Even without him, it should still doing well just follow current process. The major risk now is actually the $600m debt which it used to repurchase shares. It should pay down it to a comfort level.

12.Links
Glenn Chan have wrote many articles about it.
https://glennchan.wordpress.com/tag/altisource-asps/

also:
https://oraclefromomaha.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/altisource-portfolio-solutions/


Update
Jan 21, 2015  Recent price $24.5. 

The company held a conference at Jan 18th. to update 2015 income outlook of $4/share to $7/share. The stock recovered to over $30 briefly, then trade down again.

Update
May 04, 2015  Recent price $30.
After the company and Ocwen release their Q1 earning. Share price recovered quite well. Q1 earning around just $10m. But real cash flow is around $20m. It also includes over $13m temporary expense on employee termination and $10m data access fee to Ocwen(actually its a kick back based on Glenn Chan's writing) which is ended at Mar. 31. I estimate it could have real earning around $40m for the next 3 quarters. Thus it would have $140m in real earning for 2015. Close to the $136m medium point confirmed by the CEO.  Current market cap of $600m is still pretty cheap.

Recently the CEO and CAO bought quite some shares (worth $1.5m) at around $26/share.


Update
July 23, 2015 Recent price $39.

Q2 earning released today. The company reported $2.62/share earning which is really good. Also bought back $1.4m shares. Now total shares should around 18.7m.

It purchased Castleline( an insurance company) for $37m including 495k shares plus cash. After this, the total shares should be around 19.2m.

Sept. 29. 2017
Current price $26.
There are quite some stories with the stock in the past 2 years. The share price up and down quite a lot. However, fundamentally the business wasn't changed that much.

(1) Ocwen battered with regulator continuously. It seems no longer be able to acquire new mortgage rights. At least for now.

(2) Altisource and Ocwen signed a new contract which lowered its fees charged to Ocwen. Later Ocwen sold its mortgage to New Residential Investment (NRZ). Altisource signed a new contract with NRZ  even lowered its price. So its earing will be affected quite a bit.

(3) Today Ocwen announced it will gradually move away from RealServcing platform(from Altisource). And no new mortgage will be using RealServcing. This is part of the deal with the regulator.

(4) In my view, today's news is a clear signal that the regulator is targeting the RealServcing platform. I suspect NRZ will be moving away from it as well. Although it takes time, the company will have a bigger issue if no one will use its platform. The platform is very cost effective and both servicer and mortgage investor love it but the regulator hates it because it is not end-user friendly.

(5) I decided to stay away for now for the risk is unclear.